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MYTH, MANIPULATION, AND MINOR LEAGUE 
BASEBALL: HOW A CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 
ENGENDERS INCOME INEQUALITY 
Phillip J. Closius* 
Joseph S. Stephan** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Dreams are the foundation of American culture.1  Dreams have always 
been with us: the early religious image of America as a “city upon a hill,”2 
the immigrant dream that education leads to a better life,3 the ideal that 
anyone can grow up to be President,4 the belief that hard work will always 
pay off,5   America as the land of equal opportunity for all6—to name but 
a few.  This Article deals with one of America’s most deep-seated dreams: 
the wish of a child—and frequently the child’s parents—to play a 
professional sport.  The dream of becoming a professional athlete has 
engendered an industry of travel teams and specialized coaches catering 
to the athletic development of grade school children.7  As children 
become adults, their love of the game turns them into fans who support 
multi-billion dollar sports leagues.8   
Concepts of capitalism are as enduring as dreams in American culture.9  
Although the modern American economy contains socialistic programs 
begun in the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration,10 the cultural dialogue 
 
  * Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law 
  ** University of Baltimore School of Law, J.D. May 2020 
  1. See Matthew Wills, James Truslow Adams: Dreaming up the American Dream, JSTOR 
DAILY (May 18, 2015), https://daily.jstor.org/james-truslow-adams-dreaming-american-dream/. 
  2. See John Winthrop, A Modell of Christian Charity (1630).  
  3. See Vanessa Vallejos, Youth Voices: Life, Liberty, and Justice for All, HARV. EDUC. REV., 
Fall 2011, available at https://www.hepg.org/her-home/issues/harvard-educational-review-volume-
81-number-3/herarticle/_835.  
  4. See RICHARD K. LAIRD, THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE: WHEN LOYALTY MINIMIZES 
LEARNING 210 (2019). 
  5. See Scott Horsley, Obama's Own Story Defines His American Dream, NPR (May 30, 2012, 
4:43 PM), https://www.npr.org/2012/05/30/153994202/obamas-own-story-defines-his-american-
dream.  
  6. See JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS, THE EPIC OF AMERICA 214 (1931). 
  7. See Survey: Youth Baseball Participation on the Rise, ESPN (Aug. 23, 2019), 
https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/27448703/youth-baseball-participation-rise. 
  8. See Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record $10.7 Billion in Revenues for 2019, FORBES (Dec. 21, 
2019, 7:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/12/21/mlb-sees-record-107-billion-in-revenues-for-
2019/#172b58195d78.; Robert Kuenster, Why Fans Love the Game of Baseball, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2019, 
10:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertkuenster/2019/01/18/why-fans-love-the-game-of-baseball/#7ef6115117a1. 
  9. See Sven Beckert & Christine Desan, The New History of American Capitalism, HARVARD 
BUS. SCH. (Feb. 22, 2018), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/the-new-history-of-american-capitalism. 
  10. See Peter Canellos, What FDR Understood About Socialism that Today’s Democrats 
Don’t, POLITICO (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/08/16/democrats-
socialism-fdr-roosevelt-227622. 
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of today’s America remains overwhelmingly capitalistic.  Americans are 
suspicious of handouts and welfare.11  The term “socialism” and the label 
“socialist” are unpopular with a majority of Americans.12  Capitalism has 
earned its place in the cultural lexicon by providing Americans with an 
efficient free market economy.  In recent years, American wealth has 
grown exponentially as technology has enabled capitalistic practices to be 
adapted to the global economy.13  However, this economic boom has 
made the deficiencies of capitalism in America increasingly obvious. One 
of the most glaring deficiencies is growing income inequality.14  
American dreams and values should be reflected in the federal 
legislature, the most powerful branch of the republic created by the 
Constitution.15  The division of Congress into two chambers was intended 
as a check on this power.16  The population-based House of 
Representatives was limited by the state-based Senate.17  The Framers 
intended this structure to make Congress a reflection of a rational 
majoritarian will.18   This reality is best illustrated by the legislative 
implementation of The New Deal which transformed America from a 
libertarian state-dominated republic into a quasi-socialist federal-
dominated democracy.19  An overwhelming majority of the population 
used Congress to reject a system that was not working and create the 
foundation for modern America’s power and wealth.20  More recently, 
however, Congress has become increasingly manipulated by wealth 
generated by capitalism, especially as the cost of running for office 
soars.21  Campaign contributions and political lobbying are two methods 
by which the wealthy achieve their legislative goals.  The political 
influence of wealth has increased income disparity at a shocking rate.22 
 
  11. See Emily Ekins, What Americans Think About Poverty, Wealth, and Work, CATO 
INSTITUTE (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.cato.org/publications/survey-reports/what-americans-
think-about-poverty-wealth-work. 
  12. See id. (“A majority (59%) of Americans have favorable views of the word ‘capitalism,’ 
while 39% have an unfavorable view of it. In reverse, 39% of Americans have a favorable view of 
the word ‘socialism,’ while 59% view socialism negatively.”). 
  13. See Jerry Harris, Globalization, Technology and the Transnational Capitalist Class, 17 
FORESIGHT 194 (2015). 
  14. See Geoffrey M. Hodgson, How Capitalism Actually Generates More Inequality, 
EVONOMICS (Aug. 11, 2016), https://evonomics.com/how-capitalism-actually-generates-more-
inequality/. 
  15. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
  16. See id.  
  17. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3. 
  18. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
  19. See Louis Menand, How the Deal Went Down, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 25, 2013), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/03/04/how-the-deal-went-down. 
  20. See id.  
  21. See Soo Rin Kim, The Price of Winning Just Got Higher, Especially in the Senate, 
OPENSECRETS (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/11/the-price-of-winning-
just-got-higher-especially-in-the-senate/; see supra Part IV.B. 
 22. See As Inequality Grows, So Does the Political Influence of the Rich, THE ECONOMIST (July 
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The wealthy have frequently exploited American dreams as a means of 
increasing their resources.  The manipulation of dreams by wealthy 
capitalists is clearly illustrated in the context of American professional 
sports.  Professional sports generate billions of dollars for team owners, 
as well as large incomes  and public acclaim for elite professional 
athletes.23  However, the path to becoming an elite athlete runs through 
fierce competition against thousands of other athletes in various age 
brackets.24  Professional sports are vicious competitions of attrition in 
which the elite rise above the less talented and injured.  As stated by Sara 
Teristi, a gymnast who was a victim of Michigan State Dr. Larry Nassar: 
“People don’t understand how many broken girls it takes to produce an 
elite athlete.”25  Elite athletes cannot be created or identified without the 
cauldron of travel teams, AAU teams, high school teams, college teams, 
and minor leagues.  Without elite athletes, the enormous revenue 
generated by professional sports will disappear.   
Income inequality is evident in the financial realities of aspiring 
professional athletes who do not reach the highest level of their sport.  As 
the major sports leagues generate billions of dollars, the economic plight 
of the athletes who do not “make it,” but who support the developmental 
system of those who do, is becoming increasingly obvious.26  Wealthy 
individuals who own major sports leagues increase their resources by 
exploiting a dream and manipulating the law.27  The plight of minor 
league baseball (“MiLB”) players best exemplifies this reality.28  The 
dream of being a professional baseball player has long held a special place 




  23. However, for many elite athletes, even their wealth is an illusion.  Despite making 
millions during their careers, many professional athletes experience financial difficulties shortly 
after their retirement from sports.  See Leigh Steinberg, 5 Reasons Why 80% of Retired NFL Players 
Go Broke, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2015, 3:51 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/leighsteinberg/2015/02/09/5-reasons-why-80-of-retired-nfl-players-
go-broke/#1e4cb10678cc (It is “estimated that 80% of retired NFL players go broke in their first 
three years out of the League.”). 
  24. See Estimated Probability of Competing in Professional Athletics, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-professional-
athletics (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
  25. Abigail Pesta, The Survivor, TIME, July, 29, 2019, at 48. 
  26. See Dirk Hayhurst, An Inside Look into the Harsh Conditions of Minor League 
Baseball, BLEACHER REPORT (May 14, 2014), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2062307-an-
inside-look-into-the-harsh-conditions-of-minor-league-baseball; see also Jon Solomon, The History 
Behind the Debate over Paying NCAA Athletes, ASPEN INSTITUTE (Apr. 23, 2018), 
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/history-behind-debate-paying-ncaa-athletes/. 
  27. See Hayhurst, supra note 26 (“[A]t its lowest levels, professional baseball is 
exploitation. It has been for years—decades. So long, in fact, that it has become a victim of its own 
belief system: that a player must sacrifice and succumb to unfair treatment as part of ‘chasing the 
dream.’”); infra Part IV. 
  28. See infra Part III.B.  
  29. See DAVID LAMB, THE MINORS, in BASEBALL: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 146, 149 (1st 
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underpaying MiLB players who have almost no chance of making a Major 
League team.30  Owners also use their political influence to deny MiLB 
players many of the rights generally enjoyed by other Americans.31 
MiLB players dedicate their lives to perfecting their craft and chasing 
their major league dreams.  During the season, most MiLB players work 
well over forty hours per week at a rate lower than the federal poverty 
level.32  Furthermore, their work is not limited to the baseball season, and 
the players are not compensated for their mandatory participation in 
workouts, spring training, and development leagues.33  A former player’s 
reflection on his professional baseball career in the minors illustrates the 
plight of MiLB players: 
I wasn’t lucky to be there, I earned it. I worked my ass off to get to that 
point in my career and wouldn’t change a second of it. But, I was treated 
like property. Speaking up now has taught me a lot about this country: I 
should be grateful for the opportunity and keep my mouth shut about the 
quality of life they present to me. 
My 2017 season lasted seven months, March through September. March 
was unpaid. April – unpaid. May – unpaid. Sixteen days in June – unpaid. 
For 8-10 hours a day, six days a week, for sixteen weeks, I made $0. For 
my short season (72 games), I was paid $45 per game, or $3 an hour for 70 
hours a week. I was guaranteed two meals in my contract and rarely got 
food to eat. I had to purchase my own equipment (bats, cleats, batting 
gloves, first base mitt, etc.), rent, travel, and $80 a month for a group of 
rich high schoolers to clean my jersey. I played in front of 8,000 people a 
night and went to bed hungry. I made less money that summer than the 
batboy and after seven months of work, I left with less money than I started, 
and $2000 in credit card debt. 
I was ultimately released after that season due to a back injury. I couldn’t 
even walk as I received that phone call.34 
With wages below the poverty line and no mobility to market their 
services, MiLB players are stuck in a broken system in which pre-existing 
economic security is nearing the status of a prerequisite for a successful 
 
ed., 1994). 
  30. See infra Part III.B. 
  31. See infra Part IV. 
  32. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.  
  33. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
  34. Jeremy Wolf, I’ve Lived My Dream, BASEBALL & BUSINESS (June 6, 2018), 
https://www.baseballandbusiness.com/ive-lived-my-dream/. The grind of minor league life, as 
illustrated by Wolf, is also depicted by social media accounts dedicated to posting anonymous 
player-submitted content showing horrifying minor league conditions from a humorous angle. See 
Andersen Pickard, Talking About the Grind of Life as a Minor League Baseball Player with 




University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss1/3
88 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
baseball career.35  For many players, the financial realities of everyday 
life turn the pursuit of a dream into a financial nightmare.36  Since the 
dawn of free agency four decades ago, average Major League Baseball 
player salaries have grown about 10,000%.37  In the same period, average 
MiLB pay has not even increased enough to cover inflation.38 
This broken system has developed, in part, as a result of Major League 
Baseball’s ability to buy legislative favors that specifically exempt MiLB 
from the strictures of federal antitrust law and the requirements of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA).39  Although the failures of the courts and 
collective activity are also to blame, Congressional activity, bought and 
paid for by Major League Baseball, has deprived MiLB players of the 
ability to sue for both violations of the antitrust laws and the FLSA.40  As 
Major League Baseball and MiLB set new revenue records each year, 
major league players share in the riches while their minor league brothers 
languish in poverty.  Baseball is therefore a microcosm of the income 
inequality that afflicts the nation.    
Part II of this Article explains the structure of the minor leagues and 
the Rule 4 Draft.41  Part III illustrates the income inequality present in the 
minor leagues.42  Part IV explains how Major League Baseball has used 
the law to perpetuate the inequity plaguing the overwhelming majority of 
minor league players.43   
II. THE STRUCTURE OF MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
MiLB is divided into five classes: Triple A (“AAA”), Double A 
(“AA”), Class A (“A” or “Single-A”), Class A Short Season, and 
Rookie.44  Furthermore, Class A is split into Class A Advanced (“High 
A”) and Class A.45  The Professional Baseball Agreement (PBA) 
“provides industry stability” and binds Major League Baseball teams and 
MiLB affiliates through a series of Player Development Contracts 
 
  35. See infra Part III. 
  36. See Amy Moritz, Playing America’s ‘War of Attrition,’ THE BUFFALO NEWS (July 3, 
2016), https://buffalonews.com/2016/07/03/playing-americas-war-of-attrition/. 
  37. See Ted Berg, $12,000 a Year: A Minor Leaguer Takes His fight for Fair Pay Public, 
FTW.USATODAY.COM (Jan. 31, 2017,9:18 AM), https://ftw.usatoday.com/2017/01/minor-league-
baseball-pay-fair-labor-standards-act-minimum-wage-lawsuit-kyle-johnson. 
  38. See id.  
  39. See infra Part IV. 
  40. See infra Part IV. 
  41. See infra Part II.  
  42. See infra Part III. 
  43. See infra Part IV. 
  44. Overview of Baseball’s Minor League Organization, THE SPORTS ADVISORY GROUP, 
http://www.thesportsadvisorygroup.com/resource- library/business-of-sports/overview-of-
baseballs-minor-league-organization/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2018).  
  45. Id.  
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(PDCs).46  Each season, there are approximately 6,500 players throughout 
the minor league ranks.47 
The players, managers, coaches, trainers, and other staff throughout the 
minor leagues are paid by Major League Baseball.48  Each year, MiLB 
teams pay a fee to Major League Baseball.49   Under the current PBA, 
MiLB pays a total of $20 million each season to Major League Baseball.50  
In 2018, Major League Baseball saw record gross revenues of $10.3 
billion.51  In 2019, Major League Baseball revenue increased again to 
$10.7 billion.52   MiLB is also prospering; merchandising revenue has 
increased nearly every year over the past decade53 and team valuations 
have soared over the past few decades.54 
In the National Football League and the National Basketball 
Association, most drafted players begin their careers making comfortable 
salaries on the roster of the organization which drafted them in the next 
season immediately after being drafted, without spending several years in 
development leagues.55  In contrast, players drafted by Major League 
 
  46. Benjamin Hill, Minors Extend Agreement Through 2020, MILB (Mar. 8, 2011), 
https://www.milb.com/milb/news/minors-extend-agreement-through-2020/c-16867482. 
  47. Maury Brown, Minor League Ballplayers Would Lose Minimum Wage Rights As Part Of 
$1.3 Trillion Spending Bill, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
maurybrown/2018/03/22/minor- league-ballplayers-will-lose-minimum-wage-rights-as-part-of-1-
3-trillion-spending-bill/#41b0e47337fa. 
  48. Maury Brown, Minimum Wage Exemption is the Culmination of a Battle over MLB and 
Minor League Baseball Economics, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/ 2018/03/26/the-fragile-economics-between-mlb-the-
minors-and-the-minimum-wage-exemption/#47dfa383c219. 
  49. Id.  
  50. Eric Stephen, MLB’s Fight with Minor League Baseball is Getting Uglier, SB NATION 
(Dec. 17, 2019, 2:36 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2019/12/17/21023144/minor-league-
baseball-negotiations-mlb-bernie-sanders-rob-manfred. 
  51. Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record Revenues of $10.3 Billion for 2018, FORBES (Jan. 07, 
2019, 3:31 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/01/07/mlb-sees-record-revenues-
of-10-3-billion-for-2018/#2abb07865bea. 
  52. Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record $10.7 Billion in Revenues for 2019, FORBES (Dec. 21, 
2019, 7:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/12/21/mlb-sees-record-107-billion-in-revenues-for-
2019/#172b58195d78. 
  53. See David Broughton, MiLB, Teams Had Record Merchandising Sales in 2018, SPORTS 
BUSINESS JOURNAL (July 8, 2019), 
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2019/07/08/Research-and-Ratings/MiLB-
merchandise.aspx (“Minor League Baseball and its 160 clubs in the U.S. and Canada combined to 
a record $73.9 million in merchandise sales [in 2018] . . . . That’s up 4% from 2017’s $70.9 million 
and marks the category’s ninth straight annual increase.”). 
  54. See Ray Glier, Minor League Baseball is Better Business, Not Bigger Business, USA 
TODAY (May 8, 2017, 8:39 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2017/05/08/minor-
league-baseball-better-business-not-bigger-business/101451572/ (“[T]he valuations of teams in 
many markets has soared. Class AA teams that 30 years ago were worth $500,000 are now worth 
$16 million to $25 million in some markets”); Sergei Klebnikov, Minor League Baseball’s Most 
Valuable Teams, FORBES (July 8, 2016, 11:11 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sergeiklebnikov/2016/07/08/minor-league-baseballs-most-valuable-
teams/#6ff4581443b2 (“Minor League Baseball’s 20 most valuable teams are now worth an average 
$37.5 million, up almost 35% from 2013 when FORBES last published its MiLB valuations”). 
  55. See Topher Doll, How Long Does the Average Draft Pick Stick Around?, MILE HIGH 
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Baseball teams begin their careers in MiLB.  The Major League Baseball 
First-Year Player Draft (known as the “Rule 4 Draft”) is forty rounds long 
and results in over 1,200 players drafted each year from the United States, 
Canada and Puerto Rico.56  There are more than 240 MiLB teams 
affiliated with the thirty Major League Baseball clubs.57  If a player is 
selected in the Rule 4 Draft, the Major League Baseball team which 
drafted him holds the exclusive rights to sign him, and will assign the 
player to one of the team’s minor league affiliates after signing him to a 
contract.58 
If the player chooses to sign with the team who drafted him instead of 
continuing his amateur career at the college level, or his collegiate 
eligibility has expired, he is required by the Major League Rules (MLRs) 
to sign a MiLB Uniform Player Contract (UPC).59  If a player refuses to 
sign the UPC, he is disqualified “from playing with the contracting Club 
or entering the service of any Major or Minor League Club unless the 
player is released or assigned.”60  The UPC contains a reserve clause that 
keeps a player under control of the Major League Baseball club for seven 
seasons—effectively eliminating all of the player’s mobility and 
bargaining power during that period.61  This sort of control, paired with 
the owners’ manipulation of the players’ dreams, breeds income 
inequality that pervades throughout the minor leagues. 
III. INCOME INEQUALITY IN MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
As required by the MLRs, all first-year players are compensated 
equally, regardless of the classification of the MiLB team to which the 
player is assigned.62  There is a mandated maximum salary of $1,100 per 
month for all players in their first contract season.63  After the first season, 
 
REPORT (May 13, 2014), https://www.milehighreport.com/2014/5/13/5713996/how-long-does-the-
average-draft-pick-stick-around. 
  56. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, The Official Professional Baseball Rules Book 47 (2019), 
available at https://registration.mlbpa.org/pdf/MajorLeagueRules.pdf, [https://perma.cc/GDM3-
5JMZ]. Although the Rule 4 draft has historically been 40 rounds, its future length is unclear.  MLB 
and the MLBPA agreed in March of 2020 that the 2020 Rule 4 draft would only be 5 rounds and the 
2021 Rule 4 draft would be a minimum of 20 rounds. 
  57. Teams by Affiliation, MILB, http://www.milb.com/ milb/info/affiliations.jsp (last visited 
Dec. 26, 2018). 
  58. See First-Year Player Draft Rules, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last 
visited Dec. 26, 2018).  
  59. Major League Baseball, supra note 56, at 27-28.Foreign first-year players who are not 
subject to the Rule 4 Draft are required to sign a similar UPC to begin their careers. Id.  
  60. Id. at 40.  
  61. Id. at 27-28. 
  62. Id. at 29. 
  63. Brandon Sneed, This is What It’s Like to Chase Your Pro Baseball Dreams…For 12 Bucks 
an Hour, BLEACHER REPORT (Apr. 3, 2017), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2700299-this-is-
what-its-like-to-chase-your-pro-baseball-dreamsfor-12-bucks-an-hour.  See also The Business of 
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the UPC empowers the MiLB team to reduce the player’s compensation 
by 20% each season.64  Salaries beyond the first season are also dictated 
by the classification of a player’s assigned team.65  Minimum salaries are 
low, and the average salaries are not much higher than the minimum.66  
The weekly minimum salary for players at the rookie ball and Class A 
levels is $290.67  The weekly minimum increases to $350 at the Double 
A level, and $502 in Triple A.68  While on the road, players also receive 
a $25 per diem.69   
Most drafted players will receive a signing bonus when they execute 
the UPC.70  This bonus is in addition to the weekly salaries noted above.71  
The signing bonuses drafted players receive varies drastically due to the 
draft being forty rounds long.72  The signing bonuses are usually, but not 
always, tied to the round in which a player is drafted.73  The signing bonus 
can be millions of dollars for first round players but drops precipitously 
as each round passes.74  Signing bonuses also vary greatly within each 
round.75  Players drafted after the first ten rounds may receive signing 
bonuses up to $125,000, which can increase if the team is willing to pay 
the excess from its bonus pool allotment.76  By the twentieth round of the 
2019 draft, some players received $125,000, but others signed for as little 
 
MiLB, MILB, https://www.milb.com/about/faqs-business (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
  64. Major League Baseball, supra note 56, at at 209-10. 
  65. See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
  66. The average monthly salaries for minor league players in 2017 was: $1,300 in Class A, 
$1,600 in Class A Advanced, $3,000 in Double A, and $10,000 in Triple A.  See Ronald Blum, 
Baseball Players in Minors to Lose Minimum Wage Protection, AP NEWS (Mar. 23, 2018), 
https://www.apnews.com/cb183f59e88948e8b9cd49ad07bde807.  However, the Triple A average is 
skewed by the few players who earn significantly more because they are on major league 40-man 
rosters. See Sneed, supra note 63. The 40-man roster is the pool of players who can be added to the 
typical 25-man major league active roster. This type of roster move typically occurs when players 
on the active roster take paternity leave or are forced to miss extended time due to an injury. Those 
players who are on the 40-man roster but not the 25-man active roster remain in the minors awaiting 
the call. See also, infra note 67 (“For players on 40-man rosters on option to the minors, the 
minimum is $46,000” for the 2020 season.). Because this unique situation skews the mean, the 
median monthly Triple A salary of $5,000 is a more representative statistic. See Sneed, supra note 
63. 
  67. Associated Press, MLB to Raise Minimum Salaries for Minor League Players in 2021, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.si.com/mlb/2020/02/14/mlb-minor-league-
player-salary-increases-2021. 
  68. Id.  
  69. Blum, supra note 66. 
  70. See infra note 72. 
  71. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. 
  72. See Justin Perline, Amateur Draft Bonus Analysis, BEYONDTHEBOXSCORE (Dec. 1, 2017, 
12:00 PM), https://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2017/12/1/16715898/amateur-draft-bonus-
analysis-slot-mlb. 
  73. See Jim Callis, Here are the 2019 Draft Pools and Bonus Values, MLB (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.mlb.com/news/2019-mlb-draft-pools-and-bonus-values. 
  74. See id. 
  75. See infra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
  76. See id. 
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as $1,000, $5,000, and $10,000.77  By round 30, fewer players received 
$125,000 and even more signed for $10,000 or less.78 
The cold reality of MiLB life is that the total baseball income, 
excluding the signing bonus, that most players receive for the entire year 
is less than $7,500.79  Additionally, most MiLB players live below the 
federal poverty level.80  Of course, these values represent the 
compensation that the players receive before taxes, rent, food, childcare, 
clubhouse dues, and other expenses.81  
As a result, many players are forced to rely on their signing bonus to 
support themselves and their families for years until they make the big 
leagues (if they ever do).  Many Americans (even fans who attend games) 
assume that because they are professional athletes, MiLB players receive 
large signing bonuses and annual salaries for their services.82  In reality, 
this assumption is an exception available only to the most coveted 
prospects.83  MiLB players are therefore divided into two groups — early 
round draftees with large signing bonuses and a quicker path to Major 
League Baseball84 and the vast majority of the 6,500 minor league players 
with lesser signing bonuses and even smaller chances of making it to 
MLB.85  This divide is exemplified by the careers of two players, each 
chasing the same dream.  
A. The Exception: Bryce Harper 
The Washington Nationals selected Bryce Harper with the first overall 
pick in the 2010 Draft and signed him to a contract that included a $6.25 
million signing bonus.86  Harper was one of the most coveted prospects 
 
  77.  Round 20, MLB 2019 Draft Tracker, SPOTRAC, 
https://www.spotrac.com/mlb/draft/2019/round-20/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). 
  78. Round 30, MLB 2019 Draft Tracker, SPOTRAC, 
https://www.spotrac.com/mlb/draft/2019/round-30/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). 
  79. Brown, supra note 48. 
  80. Id. Unfortunately, the planned increase in minor league salaries scheduled to take effect 
for the 2021 season will not change this disturbing reality.  See Federal Poverty Level (FPL), 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/federal-poverty-level-fpl/ (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2020); see also Associated Press, supra note 67. 
  81. See Sneed, supra note 63. Clubhouse dues are “money for the clubhouse managers, known 
as ‘clubbies,’ who handle player laundry and pre- and postgame food spreads, which are more like 
cheap sandwiches (peanut butter and jelly, maybe deli meat on a good day or perhaps a sloppy joe) 
and plain potato chips.” Id.  
  82. See Id. 
  83. See infra Part III.A. 
  84. See infra Part III.A. 
  85. See infra Part III.B. 
  86. Adam Kilgore, Washington Nationals Sign Bryce Harper to $9.9 Million Contract, 
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 17, 2010, 2:47 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/ 
article/2010/08/16/AR2010081605133.html?noredirect=on. 
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in history.87  At the age of 16, Harper appeared on the cover of a Sports 
Illustrated magazine which described him as “the most exciting prodigy 
since LeBron” and dubbed him “Baseball’s Chosen One.”88  Harper’s 
experience—receiving a large signing bonus and quickly rising through 
the minor leagues to the big leagues—illustrates an unusual path available 
to only the most talented top prospects. 
Harper began his minor league career in 2011 with the Class A 
Hagerstown Suns, and was promoted to the Double A Harrisburg 
Senators by the end of the 2011 season.89  Harper then began the 2012 
season at the Triple A level, before making his major league debut early 
in that season and playing in 139 of 162 games for the Nationals that 
year.90  As one of the most highly-regarded prospects of all-time, Harper’s 
meteoric rise to the big leagues is atypical.  A decade after appearing on 
the cover of Sports Illustrated, Harper fulfilled the cover’s prophecy and 
signed a record-breaking thirteen-year contract with the Philadelphia 
Phillies worth $330 million guaranteed with an additional $10.4 million 
in available bonuses.91  Harper, who advanced to the big leagues quickly 
and originally received a large signing bonus, did not endure many of the 
hardships that most minor leaguers face. 
B. The Rule: Kyle Johnson 
The career of Kyle Johnson, who was drafted by the Los Angeles 
Angels in the 25th round of the 2012 draft, more accurately illustrates the 
experience of the majority of MiLB players.92  While Bryce Harper was 
a household name at age 16, most baseball fans have still never heard of 
Kyle Johnson.93  This phenomenon has led some to refer to minor leaguers 
as “the invisible men of the sport.”94 
 
  87. See infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
  88. Tom Verducci, Baseball’s LeBron, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 8, 2009, at cover (article 
at page 62). 
  89. Bryce Harper Fall & Minor League Statistics, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, 
https://www.baseballreference.com/register/ player.fcgi?id=harper002bry (last visited Dec. 24, 
2018). 
  90. Id.  
  91. Mike Axisa, Bryce Harper Contract Details: Breakdown of the Salary, Bonuses, and Perks 
in His 13-year Deal with the Phillies, CBS SPORTS (Mar. 1, 2019, 7:34 PM), 
https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/bryce-harper-contract-details-breakdown-of-the-salary-
bonuses-and-perks-in-his-13-year-deal-with-the-phillies/; see supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
Less than three weeks after Harper inked the record-breaking deal, Mike Trout shattered Harper’s 
record by signing a 12-year extension with the Angels for $430 million. See Scott Allen, Mike Trout 
Upstages Bryce Harper Again, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 19, 2019, 11:47 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2019/03/19/mike-trout-upstages-bryce-harper-again/. 
  92. See Sneed, supra note 63; Verducci, supra note 88. 
  93. See Verducci, supra note 88.  
  94. Theodore McDowell, Changing the Game: Remedying the Deficiencies of Baseball’s 
Antitrust Exemption in the Minor Leagues, 9 J. HARV. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 1 (2018). 
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Since only about 10% of MiLB prospects reach the major leagues, the 
chilling reality for about 90% of minor leaguers resembles Johnson’s 
bleak financial situation.95  Johnson received a signing bonus of $5,000, 
which came out to about $3,100 after taxes.96  After signing his UPC, 
Johnson began his professional baseball career in Utah at the Rookie level 
with the Orem Owlz, where he received about $420 for his first biweekly 
paycheck.97  Johnson made about $2,500 in the first year of his 
professional career, which he calculated to be about $35 per game.98  
Johnson spent the next few years of his professional career playing at 
various levels.99  He spent 2013 playing in Class A and Class A 
Advanced, and played Double A for the entire 2014 season.100  Johnson 
split the 2015 season between Triple A, Rookie ball, and Class A 
Advanced.101  He then played Double A and Triple A during the 2016 
season, which would turn out to be the final year of his professional 
career.102  
For Johnson, who has a degree in economics and “exists in the top 
0.001 percentile of talent in his field,” chasing his dream in the minors 
meant relying on the roughly $30,000 his wife earned from multiple jobs 
to keep their family afloat.103  Johnson was also forced to borrow a vehicle 
from his aunt and uncle for transportation, give baseball lessons for extra 
income, and even intern at Northwestern Mutual in the offseason when 
his unpaid offseason baseball obligations did not interfere.104  Johnson 
played five seasons in the minors and advanced as high as the Triple A 
level, but never made more than $11,500 in a season.105  During spring 
training heading in to his sixth season, Johnson felt financial pressures as 
he pondered his future.106  
 
  95. See Matthew Durham, Minor League Compensation and the Save America’s Pastime Act 
of 2018, THE NEV. LAW., Aug. 2018, at 17, 17; see also Nathan Sorensen, Minor League 
Ballplayers' Path to the Bigs has Major Obstacles, so Family is No Small Thing, DESERET NEWS 
(May 15, 2015, 4:25 PM), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/865628804/Minor-league-
ballplayers-path-to-the-bigs-has-major-obstacles-so-family-is-no-small-thing.html. 
  96. Sneed, supra note 63. 
  97. Id. 
  98. Id. 
  99. Kyle Johnson Minor & Winter Leagues Statistics and History, BASEBALL-
REFERENCE.COM, https://www.baseball-reference.com/register/player.fcgi?id=johnso005kyl (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2018). 
  100. Id.  
  101. Id. 
  102. Id. 
  103. Berg, supra note 37; see Sneed, supra note 63. 
  104. Sneed, supra note 63. Despite baseball obligations, many players must take flexible 
offseason jobs—such as substitute teaching and waiting tables—to make ends meet. See Tom 
Goldman, Fight Against Low, Low Pay In Minor League Baseball Continues Despite New Obstacles, 
NPR (Aug. 3, 2018, 5:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/03/635373608/fight-against-low-low-
pay-in-minor-league-baseball-continues-despite-new-obstacl. 
  105. Sneed, supra note 63. 
  106. See id.; see supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
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Before spring training, Johnson became the first active minor league 
player “to publicly declare his part in an ongoing class-action lawsuit 
against Major League Baseball over unfair wages and unjust labor 
practices.”107  Although the work was mandatory, Johnson was not even 
being compensated for his work during spring training, as the UPC he 
signed in 2012 specified that he was “obligate[d] . . . to perform 
professional services on a calendar year basis, regardless of the fact that 
salary payments are to be made only during the actual championship 
playing season.”108  At this time, Johnson was still under the control of 
the New York Mets for two more years.109  The Mets rejected his request 
for a higher salary, leaving Johnson with only three options.110  
His first option was to play for the next two seasons until he would 
become a free agent at the end of his UPC.111  Otherwise, Johnson could 
retire from professional baseball or ask to be released.112  Burdened by 
the cost of chasing his dream, Johnson asked for his release and the Mets 
obliged.113  The trying financial realities of the minor leagues and the 
difficulty of supporting his wife and two young children led Johnson to 
end his baseball career.114  Johnson’s story is a familiar tragedy to most 
minor league players and represents the effects of Major League 
Baseball’s longstanding manipulation of the law to increase its own 
profits to the detriment of thousands of MiLB players.115 
IV. HOW MLB MANIPULATES THE LAW AND DREAMS TO PERPETUATE 
THE INEQUALITY OF MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
The situation that minor leaguers face has developed as a result of three 
predominant factors: decisions by the United States Supreme Court, laws 
passed by Congress, and the lack of collective will to unionize.  
A. The Failure of the Supreme Court 
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits contracts or 
 
  107. Sneed, supra note 63. 
  108. See Major Leage Baseball, supra note 56, at 207-09. The “actual championship playing 
season” includes only the schedule of regular-season games; it is five months long and does not 
include spring training. See id. at 205-06. 
  109. Sneed, supra note 63. Minor league players are considered employees of the major league 
team. Blum, supra note66. 
  110. Sneed, supra note 63. 
  111. See Major League Baseball, supra note 56, at 183. 
  112. Sneed, supra note 63. 
  113. Id. 
  114. See id.  
  115. See infra Part IV.  
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conspiracies in restraint of trade.116  The Supreme Court has interpreted 
this prohibition to encompass only unreasonable restraints of trade.117  
Application of the Sherman Act therefore does not guarantee a plaintiff a 
win.118  The challenged practice only violates the Act if the 
precompetitive benefits do not outweigh the anticompetitive effects.119  
However, the plaintiff does not have to win such a balancing test if the 
practice fits into one of four judicially declared per se violations.120       
One of the most useful, and most disturbing, tools that Major League 
Baseball uses to pay MiLB players like Johnson such low wages is the 
antitrust exemption that was manufactured by a trio of twentieth century 
Supreme Court cases commonly known as “the Supreme Court’s baseball 
trilogy.”121  If taken out of the context of professional baseball and 
implanted into nearly any other American industry, the Rule 4 Draft and 
required UPCs would violate antitrust law as illegal restraints of trade.122 
However, in 1922, Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion for the Court 
in Federal Baseball Club v. National League, held that the business, 
“giving exhibitions of baseball,” was a “purely state affair[].”123  The 
Court acknowledged that baseball clubs travelled among the states, but 
held that the business of baseball did not constitute interstate 
commerce.124  The Court noted that “a firm of lawyers sending out a 
member to argue a case . . . does not engage in [interstate] commerce 
because the lawyer . . . goes to another State.”125  Thus, professional 
baseball did not trigger federal antitrust law, and the antitrust exemption 
was born.126  Federal Baseball, however, was consistent with the limited 
interpretation of interstate commerce and federal power that permeated 
Supreme Court jurisprudence prior to the revolutionary change in 
perspective in 1937.127  
Surprisingly, even after the vast expansion of the American 
understanding of interstate commerce in the FDR era, Federal Baseball 
 
  116. 15 U.S.C. § 1(2018). 
  117. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
  118. See id. 
  119. Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1375, 1386 (2009). 
  120. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)(listing price fixing, division of 
markets, tying arrangements, and group boycotts as per se violations). 
  121. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 438 (E.D. Pa. 1993). See infra notes 
123–134 and accompanying text. 
  122. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018); see also supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text. 
  123. Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922).  
  124. Id. at 209.  
  125. Id. 
  126. See id. at 208. 
  127. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109 
(Foundation Press, 18th ed. 2013). 
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persisted.128  In Toolson v. New York Yankees, the Court reaffirmed 
Federal Baseball “so far as that decision determines that Congress had no 
intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the 
federal antitrust laws.”129  In its 1953 opinion, the Court noted that: 
Congress has had [Federal Baseball] under consideration but has not seen 
fit to bring such business under these laws by legislation having 
prospective effect. The business has thus been left for thirty years to 
develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust 
legislation. The present cases ask us to overrule the prior decision and, with 
retrospective effect, hold the legislation applicable. We think that if there 
are evils in this field which now warrant application to it of the antitrust 
laws it should be by legislation.130 
The Court, therefore, did not apply its own expansive interpretation of 
interstate commerce to baseball and decided Toolson’s case entirely on 
the authority of Federal Baseball.131 
The Court reaffirmed its belief that legislative, not judicial, action was 
the proper avenue to apply antitrust laws to professional baseball in Flood 
v. Kuhn.132  The Court, describing the antitrust exemption as an 
established “aberration,” noted that it did not apply to other professional 
sports and stated that professional baseball is indeed a business engaged 
in interstate commerce pursuant to post–1937 Supreme Court 
decisions.133  Nonetheless, the Court stated that it “continue[d] to be loath, 
50 years after Federal Baseball and almost two decades after Toolson, to 
overturn those cases judicially when Congress, by its positive inaction, 
has allowed those decisions to stand for so long and . . . has clearly 
evinced a desire not to disapprove them legislatively.”134  Ironically, the 
Supreme Court also concluded that state antitrust law did not apply to 
baseball because it was engaged in interstate commerce.135 
The Flood decision was not well received by the legal community.136  
Dreams of baseball were of such importance in American culture that the 
Supreme Court ignored decades of established precedent regarding the 
definition of interstate commerce to give baseball its own exemption.137  
 
  128. See id.; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
  129. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953). 
  130. Id. (alterations added). 
  131. See id.  
  132. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972). 
  133. Id. at 282–83. 
  134. Id. at 283–84. 
  135. See id. at 284–85. 
  136. See, e.g., Kevin D. McDonald, There’s No Tying in Baseball: On Illinois Tool and the 
Presumption of Market Power in Patent Tying Cases, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Sept. 2005, at 10 
(“The result is a principle of antitrust law that is (1) indefensible as a matter of fact or policy, and 
(2) an embarrassment to the Court.”).  
  137. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282–84. 
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The tone of the opinion reflected baseball’s place in the American 
dream.138  The opinion begins with a discussion of the history of the game 
as the nation’s pastime and an extensive list of baseball’s immortals.139  
The majority also cites with glee the opinion denying Flood’s preliminary 
injunction, in which District Court Judge Cooper stated that “[b]aseball . 
. . enjoys a unique place in our American heritage. . . . The game is on 
higher ground; it behooves everyone to keep it there.”140  In Flood, the 
Supreme Court prevented the players from using the antitrust laws as they 
were intended and preserved the owners’ control over the players and 
their financial interests.141 
B.  The Failure of Congress 
Congress finally acted legislatively in response to the outrageous Flood 
decision—albeit twenty-eight years after the case—by passing the Curt 
Flood Act of 1998.142  The Curt Flood Act stated that “the conduct, acts, 
practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized 
professional major league baseball directly relating to or affecting 
employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major 
league level are subject to the antitrust laws.”143  Congress effectively 
overruled the Court and finally granted major league players the same 
access to the antitrust laws that every American enjoys.144 Since the 
passage of the act, compensation packages for major league players have 
risen even more dramatically.145 
 However, the Curt Flood Act, without explanation, expressly states that 
it does not apply to any actions of those “engaging in, conducting or 
participating in the business of . . . [Minor League Baseball], any 
organized professional baseball amateur or first-year player draft . . . any 
reserve clause as applied to minor league players . . . or any other matter 
relating to professional baseball’s minor leagues.”146  Congress has 
therefore decided that MiLB players cannot successfully challenge the 
Rule 4 Draft and UPC reserve clauses as illegal restraints of trade under 
 
  138. See id. at 260–64. 
  139. See id.  
  140. See id. at 266–67 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)). 
  141. See id. at 282–85. 
  142. See Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824 (Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
26b (2018)). 
  143. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a)(2018).  
  144. See supra notes 141–143 and accompanying text.  
  145. See Cork Gaines & Skye Gould, The Salaries for Baseball’s Highest-paid Players have 
Skyrocketed over the Past 20 Years, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 3, 2017, 1:44 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/mlb-average-highest-paid-salary-2017-4. 
  146. 15 U.S.C. § 26(b)(1) (2018).  
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Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.147  Thus, MiLB players have 
been, and will continue to be, unable to remedy their situation on antitrust 
grounds even though Major League Baseball players can do so.  
 Why would Congress remove the exemption for those players who 
make the most money and have the most resources while continuing the 
exemption for those players with the least money and least resources?148  
The legislative history indicates a clear and consistent effort to ensure that 
the Curt Flood Act would have no impact on the legal status of MiLB.149   
Congress was clearly protecting the economic interests of the Major 
League Baseball owners by its inconsistent treatment of MiLB.150   
Because minor leaguers lack the star power of their major league 
counterparts and the lobbying power of the owners, they are in most need 
of legislative protection.  However, the modern democratic process again 
failed to protect the interests of those least able to defend themselves.151   
In light of the seemingly insurmountable hurdles posed by an antitrust 
challenge, lawsuits challenging minor league compensation in recent 
years have focused on alleged violations of the FLSA minimum wage and 
overtime requirements.152 MLB has traditionally relied on the FLSA 
exemptions for “employee[s] employed in a bona fide executive, 
administrative, or professional capacity” and for seasonal amusement or 
recreational establishments in 29 U.S.C. §§ 213(a)(1) & (3).153   Major 
League Baseball, which has stated that “being a Minor League Baseball 
player is not a career but a short-term seasonal apprenticeship[,]” 
determined that a loss in court “would cost it approximately $110 million, 
a figure that could double if the court assigned damages, and none of that 
accounts for additional costs going forward.”154 
After spending $330,000 on lobbying expenses in 2015, Major League 
Baseball increased its lobbying efforts by 300%, spending $1.32 million 
in each of the next two years in response to class-action suits filed by 
 
  147. See id.; see also McDowell, supra note 94, at 15. 
  148. See supra notes 142–147 and accompanying text.  
  149. See S. REP. NO. 105-118, pt. 2, at 4–5 (1997). 
  150. See id. 
  151. Nearly 28% of minor league players are foreign-born, about 80% of which come from 
Venezuela and the Dominican Republic.  J.J. Cooper, Numbers Game: Makeup of the Minors, 
BASEBALL AMERICA (May 4, 2018), https://www.baseballamerica.com/stories/numbers-game-
makeup-of-the-minors/.  At the major league level, a study by the Society for American Baseball 
Research revealed that, in 2016, the racial composition of the major leagues was 63.7% White, 6.7% 
African-American, 27.4% Latino, and 2.1% Asian.  Mark Armour & Daniel R. Levitt, Baseball 
Demographics, 1947–2016, SOCIETY FOR AMERICAN BASEBALL RESEARCH, 
https://sabr.org/bioproj/topic/baseball-demographics-1947-2012 (last visited Feb. 29, 2020). 
  152. See, e.g., Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 105 F.Supp.3d 981 (N.D. Cal. 2015); 
29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (2018).  
  153. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)(2018); 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)(2018); See Senne v. Kan. City Royals 
Baseball Corp., No. 14-CV-00608-JCS, 2015 WL 6152476, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2015). 
  154. Berg, supra note 37; Brown, supra note 48.  
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former minor league players.155  As a result of this increased lobbying 
effort, Congress passed legislation expressly exempting MiLB from the 
requirements of the FLSA.156  
The ironically named “Save America’s Pastime Act,” (SAPA) which 
was included on page 1,967 of the 2,232-page March 2018 Senate 
appropriations bill, passed without a single co-sponsor or sufficient time 
to debate.157  The SAPA “saved” an eleven-figure industry by preying on 
its powerless, invisible backbone that actually needs to be saved.158  The 
language of the 2018 SAPA nearly mirrors that of a stand-alone version 
of the bill introduced in 2016.159  Support for the 2016 SAPA was 
withdrawn within days of its introduction after a quick and harsh public 
uproar.160  Commentators have described the enacted SAPA as “a 
textbook piece of special-interest legislation[.]”161  The Legislature’s 
willingness to severely disadvantage a particular group of struggling 
people at the whim of a $10 billion industry is alarming, especially when 
the cost of vastly improving the plight of MiLB players is comparatively 
small.162 
The enacted 2018 SAPA keeps MiLB players at the status quo by 
nearly ensuring that they will be unable to remedy their situations on 
FLSA grounds.163  The impact of this momentous decision to give Major 
 
  155. See Senne, 2015 WL 6152476, at *1; Blake Yagman, Senne v. Royals is the Case that 
Could Change Major League Baseball, FANSIDED (Oct. 25, 2017), 
https://fansided.com/2017/10/25/senne-v-royals-lawsuit-could-change-mlb/; Blum, supra note66.  
  156. See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)(19)(2018). 
  157. H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. §201 (2018) (enacted); see Durham, supra note 95, at 18. 
  158. See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)(19)(2018); see supra note 51 and accompanying text; see supra 
Part III.B. 
  159. See Blum, supra note66. 
  160. See H.R. 5580. See, e.g., Ted Berg, The ‘Save America’s Pastime Act’ in Congress will 
do Nothing of the Sort, USA TODAY (June 30, 2016, 10:30 AM), 
https://ftw.usatoday.com/2016/06/save-americas-pastime-act-minor-league-minimum-wage-
lawsuit-mlb-salaries; Aaron Blake, After Outcry over Minor League Baseball Bill, Congresswoman 
Can’t Disown it Fast Enough, THE WASH. POST (June 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/06/30/after-outcry-over-bill-on-minor-league-baseball-pay-
congresswoman-cant-disown-it-fast-enough/?utm_term=.df099baf8bf1; Ryan Fagan, Despicable 
‘Save America’s Pastime Act’ Aims to Screw Minor Leaguers, SPORTING NEWS (June 29, 2016), 
http://www.sportingnews.com/us /mlb/news/minor-league-save-americas-pastime-act-salaries-
antitrust-exemption-broshuis-congress/1jjn290g1ubcd18af2tjyb1u7l; Lindsay Gibbs, The ‘Save 
America’s Pastime Act’ Aims to Keep Minor League Baseball Players in Poverty, THINKPROGRESS 
(June 30, 2016, 5:10 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/the-save-americas-pastime-act-aims-to-keep-
minor-league-baseball-players-in-poverty-2f812a055701/. 
  161. Nathaniel Grow, The Save America’s Pastime Act: Special-Interest Legislation 
Epitomized, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 1013, 1046 (2019). 
  162. See Mueller, infra note 184 (“For an investment of $7.5 million per year, an MLB 
organization could adequately pay their minor leaguers, which would allow those players to eat 
better, get better housing during the season, and train better in the offseason.”); see also Berg, supra 
note 37 (“A major league organization with 250 players in its minor league system could give every 
single one of them a $30,000 annual pay spike for a total of $7.5 million, or roughly the cost of a 
decent fourth outfielder on the free-agent market.”). But see McDowell, supra note 94, at Part V. 
  163. See Brown, supra note 48; Durham, supra note 95, at 18. 
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League Baseball legislative permission to skirt FLSA requirements is 
already evident.  After the passage of SAPA, Major League Baseball 
proposed eliminating forty-two minor leagues teams in negotiations for 
the next PBA.164  News of this proposal quickly drew bipartisan 
opposition from the very Congress that emboldened major league owners 
by consistently allowing the league to act as if it is above the law.165  
Perhaps recognizing their own failure, some members of Congress 
“launched the Save Minor League Baseball Task Force for a simple 
purpose — to help ensure a level playing field in the negotiations between 
Major League Baseball and MiLB so that they yield a fair resolution and 
protect minor league baseball in communities across the country.”166  This 
task force is motivated by congressional self-interest, as it is focused on 
preventing the elimination of teams that could negatively impact local 
economies, rather than addressing past legislative missteps such as the 
Curt Flood Act and SAPA, which have allowed the horrific conditions of 
MiLB to germinate.   
In reaction to the Congressional Task Force, the Major League 
Baseball Commissioner’s Office sent a memo to the teams detailing plans 
to raise MiLB minimum salaries in 2021.167  However, this concession 
was motivated by fear of Congressional action rather than a desire to 
eliminate the plight of MiLB players.  Even after this pay increase takes 
effect, the majority of MiLB players will still live below the poverty 
line.168  Despite mandatory spring training and other offseason obligations 
that frequently interfere with a player’s ability to maintain stable 
offseason employment, players are still only paid during the season.169  
Although it is a step in the right direction, this pay increase is far from 
adequate and would still result in FLSA violations if MLB had not 
purchased the immunity granted by SAPA.  
C. The Failure of Collective Activity 
MiLB players also lack union representation as a means of improving 
 
  164. Eric Stephen, MLB’s Fight with Minor League Baseball is Getting Uglier, SB NATION 
(Dec. 17, 2019, 2:36 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2019/12/17/21023144/minor-league-
baseball-negotiations-mlb-bernie-sanders-rob-manfred. 
  165. See Alex Gangitano, MLB, Congress Play Hardball in Fight over Minor Leagues, THE 
HILL (Feb. 6, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-a-
lobbying/481755-mlb-congress-play-hardball-in-fight-over-minor-leagues. 
  166. Id.  
  167. See Associated Press, supra note 67 (“Players at rookie and short-season levels will see 
their minimum weekly pay raised from $290 to $400, and players at Class A will go from $290 to 
$500. Double-A will jump from $350 to $600, and Triple-A from $502 to $700.”).  
  168. See id.; see also Federal Poverty Level (FPL), supra note 80. 
  169. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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their financial situation.170  In fact, the Major League Baseball Players 
Association (MLBPA), which does not represent the minor leagues, has 
used matters that affect minor leaguers as convenient concessions in their 
own negotiations and have even made minor league conditions worse.171  
Unionization and the resulting ability to bargain collectively could be an 
effective avenue to remedy the dismal conditions of the minor leagues.  
However, the transient nature of the players, wide geographic dispersion, 
and low salaries present major hurdles to unionization.172  However, the 
players’ fear of potential retaliation or “blackballing” presents perhaps the 
most formidable obstacle to unionization.173  This fear of retaliation is 
another example of owners manipulating players’ baseball dreams.  
Marvin Miller, the transformational former Executive Director of the 
MLBPA, has even said that one of the obstacles to unionizing the minor 
leagues is the “dreamy idealism of the players.”174  In effect, a player is 
concerned that participation in union activity will cost him his shot at 
making it to the major leagues one day.175  
A final formidable obstacle to unionization is the split among the minor 
league players who received large signing bonuses and those who did not.  
Players with large bonuses not only have more resources but are also often 
fast-tracked to the major leagues.176  In the minors, their interests are 
frequently aligned with major league management.  The consistent refusal 
of these minor league “stars” to join any unionization efforts have also 
been a significant factor in the failure of all efforts to unionize minor 
league players.   
Collective bargaining would undoubtedly help improve the financial 
condition of most MiLB players.177  The potential benefits of a union are 
illustrated by another group that is crucial to the MiLB ecosystem—the 
umpires.178  The minor league umpires, who are unionized, received a 
myriad of perks under their new collective bargaining agreement, 
including improved hotels and increased salaries and per diems.179  The 
per diems for umpires at every level are higher than the per diems the 
 
  170. See Garrett R. Broshuis, Touching Baseball’s Untouchables: The Effects of Collective 
Bargaining on Minor League Baseball Players, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 51 (2013). 
  171. Id. at 90. 
  172. Id. at 98–100. 
  173. See id. at 100; see also Berg, supra note 37. 
  174. Lily Rothman, Emancipation of the Minors, SLATE (Apr. 3, 2012, 11:08 AM), 
https://slate.com/culture/2012/04/minor-league-union-thousands-of-pro-baseball-players-make-
just-1100-per-month-where-is-their-cesar-chavez.html. 
  175. See Broshuis, supra note 170, at 100; see also Berg, supra note 37. 
  176. See supra Part III.A. 
  177. See Broshuis, supra note 170, at 98–99. 
  178. See Liz Roscher, Minor League Umpires are Getting Better Perks in Their New CBA, 
YAHOO! SPORTS (Jan. 12, 2017, 10:53 AM), https://sports.yahoo.com/news/minor-league-umpires-
are-getting-better-perks-in-their-new-cba-155352828.html. 
  179. See id.  
19
Closius and Stephan: Myth, Manipulation, and Minor League Baseball
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020
2020] MYTH, MANIPULATION, AND MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 103 
players themselves receive, and the umpires’ monthly salaries are higher 
than the salaries of most MiLB players.180  These perks are made possible 
partly by the fact that MiLB is generating record levels of merchandising 
revenue.181  
Additionally, the financial success of MiLB allows for teams to offer 
free concessions to fans for an entire half inning.182  This promotional 
“Food Purge”—as it is advertised by the Lansing Lugnuts—ironically 
juxtaposes the financial ability of the organization to offer fans free 
concessions while many of the Lugnuts players the fans came to see 
struggle to adequately feed themselves.183  
Advocates for minor league unionization point to the Professional 
Hockey Players Association (PHPA) as evidence of its feasibility.184  The 
PHPA is “a 50-year-old union that represents some 1,600 minor league 
hockey players across the American Hockey League and the East Coast 
Hockey League.  The PHPA has successfully negotiated to guarantee its 
members reasonable wages, in-season housing, adequate per diems, and 
revenue sharing, among other benefits.”185  MiLB teams play more games 
per season and have higher average attendance per game, but the players 
only receive about 25% of the minimum salary and 1/3 of the travel per 
diem compared to their counterparts in the American Hockey League 
(”AHL”).186 Additionally, AHL players can earn postseason bonuses, 
whereas MiLB players cannot.187  In sharp contrast to MiLB players, 
“[p]layers in the AHL are unionized and have a minimum salary of 
$45,000, get a postseason bonus, and $72 per diem.”188  
While the need to unionize and bargain collectively is clear, the MiLB 
players’ desperate financial situations, the widespread fear of retaliation, 
and the reticence of stars to support the collective unit have consistently 
delivered fatal blows to past unionization efforts.189  Of these three 
obstacles, improving the compensation of MiLB players may be the 
easiest to change.  The bleak prospect of unionization is unlikely to 
 
  180. See id.  
  181. See David Broughton, Appeal of MiLB Merchandise Continues to Grow; Sales Hit $70M 
in 2017, SPORTS BUS. J., July 23, 2018, available 
athttps://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2018/07/23/Research-and-Ratings/MiLB-
merchandise.aspx. 
  182. See Minor League Baseball (@milb), INSTAGRAM (Feb. 5, 2019), 
https://www.instagram.com/p/Btghc4EFViC/?utm_source=ig_share_sheet&igshid=19qdju20qr0vy 
  183. See id.  
  184. See Bobby Mueller, MLB and Minor League Salaries: The Ugly Business Side of 
Baseball, CALLTOTHEPEN (Mar. 22, 2018), https://calltothepen.com/2018/03/22/mlb-minor-ugly-
business/; see also Berg, supra note 37.  
  185. Berg, supra note 37. 
  186. Id. 
  187. Id.  
  188. Mueller, supra note 184. 
  189. See supra notes 173—175 and accompanying text. 
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improve until the financial situation of the individual players improves.  
The result is a vicious cycle in which the players’ poor financial 
conditions perpetuate their lack of a union, and their lack of a union 
worsens their financial conditions.  If Congress were to remove both the 
antitrust and FLSA exemptions, the financial condition of minor league 
players would improve and collective activity would be more likely.   
MiLB players have made some efforts to help themselves short of 
unionization.  In response to the SAPA, Jeremy Wolf founded More Than 
Baseball, a 501(c)(3) public charity to support MiLB players.190  Wolf, a 
31st round draft pick by the New York Mets in 2016, started the 
organization “as a way to help minor leaguers receive the housing, 
equipment, and food they need to survive.”191  More Than Baseball aims 
to spread awareness to fans and uncover baseball’s best kept secret, 
explaining on its website that “over 4000 minor league ballplayers are in 
need of financial assistance[,]” and that the players “are subject to poor 
working conditions and are on the hook for their own housing, equipment, 
and nutrition.”192  
More Than Baseball “refuse[s] to allow any ballplayers go to bed 
hungry and wake up on an air mattress only to play in front of thousands 
of paying fans per night.”193  The organization, which is available to all 
minor leaguers, helps the players obtain essential baseball equipment in 
addition to basic living necessities such as proper nutrition and affordable 
housing.194  Additionally, More Than Baseball provides career and 
financial services to prepare players for life after baseball, which is 
particularly important considering that only a small fraction of minor 
leaguers advance to the big leagues.195  While laudable, More Than 
Baseball does not remedy the financial exploitation of MiLB players just 
as a soup kitchen does not solve the problem of homelessness.   
V. CONCLUSION 
In a democracy, the legislature should reflect the concepts of fairness 
and equality which the nation truly values.  As Congress has become 
increasingly influenced by uber-wealth, the growth of income inequality 
has reduced the ideals of fairness and equality to their bare minimum.  
This reality is easily identified in the plight of most MiLB players.  
 
  190. Meet the Staff, , MORE THAN BASEBALL, https://www.morethanbaseball.org/about-us 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2020). 
  191. Id.  
  192. Mission, MORE THAN BASEBALL, https://www.morethanbaseball.org/mission (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2020).  
  193. Id.  
  194. Id. 
  195. Id.; see supra note 95 and accompanying text.  
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Although Supreme Court decisions and the players’ own lack of 
collective will has worsened the situation, it is Congress who has 
perpetuated the appalling economic reality for the players who support 
the foundation of Major League Baseball.  Neither the House nor the 
Senate has provided any rationale for explicitly preventing MiLB players 
from suing Major League Baseball based on the nation’s antitrust laws196 
or the FLSA.197  The only explanation is the influence of wealthy Major 
League Baseball owners over Congress, as reflected by their increased 
lobbying expenditures.198  Given the public outcry against the first attempt 
by Congress to exempt MiLB  players from federal minimum wage laws, 
Congress’ actions can also be characterized as counter majoritarian.   
Congress should therefore repeal both the antitrust immunity and the 
exemption from the FLSA it has given Major League Baseball and the 
owners.  The cost of doing so will not destroy major or minor league 
baseball.  The result will simply lift the majority of minor league players 
from poverty by reducing the profits of Major League Baseball owners 
only incidentally.  The games will still flourish.  In addition, such action 
by Congress will make collective activity by MiLB players more likely. 
As the nation’s pastime, the game of baseball “reflects a host of age-
old American tensions: between workers and owners, scandal and reform, 
the individual and the collective.”199   Baseball even had a key role in the 
beginning of racial equality in America.200  Baseball has been “a sort of 
Rosetta stone for deciphering our still revolutionary experiment in 
nationhood[,]” and the game “has realized—through individualized 
brilliance or teamwork or racial harmony—the highest of our country’s 
ideals.”201  Baseball has advanced our nation, and the undeniable parallels 
between the game and the law were acknowledged in the Federal 
Baseball opinion.202  In return, the law has largely turned its back on the 
game’s most vulnerable.203  By rectifying its past mistakes, Congress can 
 
  196. See supra notes 143–147 and accompanying text. 
  197. See supra notes 157–163 and accompanying text. 
  198. See supra notes 155–156 and accompanying text.  Other sports capitalists understand the 
value of lobbying congress.  Because California passed a statue allowing its collegiate athletes to 
profit from their name, image, and likeness, the NCAA and some conferences have dramatically 
increased their lobbying expenditures in an attempt to get Congress to pass a law on the subject 
favorable to their interests.  See Cassandra Negley, NCAA, ACC, Big 12 Spend Nearly $1M to 
Prevent Athletes from Profiting Off Own Likeness, YAHOO! SPORTS (Feb. 10, 2020, 6:28 PM), 
https://sports.yahoo.com/ncaa-acc-big-12-spend-nearly-1-m-to-keep-athletes-from-earning-
money-off-marketing-deals-232823064.html. 
  199. Ken Burns & Lynn Novick, Where Memory Gathers, in BASEBALL: AN ILLUSTRATED 
HISTORY xvii, xvix (1st ed., 1994). 
  200. See John Thorn, Why Baseball, in BASEBALL: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 58, 61 (1st ed., 
1994). 
  201. Id. at 58. 
  202. See id.; see supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
  203. See supra Part IV.  
22
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss1/3
106 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
provide a solution to baseball’s best kept secret—the treatment of 
MiLB—and may truly save America’s pastime.  In so doing, Congress 
would also be taking a first step in realizing its own responsibility in 
eliminating income inequality in America. 
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